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A B S T R A C T
The ideal of objectivity is in crisis in science and the law, and yet it continues to do important work in both
practices. This article describes that crisis and develops a shared rescue strategy for objectivity in both domains.
In a recent article, Inkeri Koskinen (2018) attempts to bring unity to the fragmented discourse on objectivity in
the philosophy of science with a risk account of objectivity. To put it simply, she argues that we call practi-
tioners, processes, and products of science objective when they identify and manage certain important epistemic
risks. We endorse this view and attempt to tailor Koskinen's strategy to the problem of objectivity in the legal
context. To do so, we develop a novel notion of phronetic risk, and argue that we call practitioners, processes,
and products of law objective when they identify and manage certain important epistemic and/or phronetic
risks. Our attempt to rescue objectivity is especially important for work at the intersection of law and psychiatry.
For that intersection represents a place where skeptical worries about objectivity in science and law work in
tandem to pose serious critical challenges to contemporary practice; and our rescue strategy represents a pro-
mising way to negotiate those challenges.
1. Introduction
Objectivity is a central concern for many of the issues at stake in this
journal; the intersection of law and psychiatry is a place where skeptical
worries about objectivity in science and law work in tandem to pose
serious critical challenges to contemporary practice. For instance,
concerns about the scientific objectivity of psychiatry abound in the
literature on mental disorders. Skeptics treat the term “mental disorder”
as a purely evaluative term designed to justify medical intervention
(Szasz, 1974); skeptics and non-skeptics alike point out that the diag-
nosis of mental disorders sometimes serves as a social tool of oppression
that stigmatizes perfectly healthy but aneurotypical people (Eysenck,
Wakefield, and Friedman, 1983); and non-skeptics who hold that
mental disorders have an underlying physiological basis still insist that
the concept has an ineliminable value component (Wakefield, 1992).
Moreover, this evaluative dimension of the concept of mental disorder
drives worries that the field of psychiatry is just not as objective as
other areas of medicine. On the other side of this debate, however,
defenders of psychiatry's objectivity point out that it operates within
the scientific medical model (Shah & Mountain, 2007), and they argue
that if we take interrater reliability as a measure of objectivity, “psy-
chiatric diagnosis is often as objective as that in most other medical
specialties” (Pies, 2007, p. 20). Concerns over objectivity in psychiatry
thus pose two main questions: 1) is there such a thing as objective
psychiatric disorder out there in the world; 2) if objective psychiatric
disorder exists, can we objectively identify and measure it?
A similar back and forth plays out in the relevant legal discourse.
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities echoes the
critics of psychiatry in its General Comment No 1 (UN Committee on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2014), when they claim, “Mental
capacity is not, as is commonly presented, an objective, scientific and
naturally occurring phenomenon (par. 14).” Moreover, many disability
rights advocates argue that mental health law fails to be objective in
that it reflects blatant bias against persons with intellectual and psy-
chosocial disabilities (Harpur, 2009), arguing that the law takes cover
behind the rhetoric of objectivity, while it stigmatizes and imposes
“ableist” norms on persons with intellectual and psychosocial dis-
abilities. But this skeptical viewpoint does not predominate. The Eur-
opean Court of Human Rights, for instance, specifies that the lawful
deprivation of a person's liberty on the grounds that she is of “unsound
mind” must be based on “objective medical expertise” and “objective
medical evidence” (European Court of Human Rights, 2012 par. 103,
emphasis added). Far from an idle theoretical question, then, objec-
tivity is a central concern for contemporary public policy challenges at
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the intersection of psychiatry and the law.
Unfortunately, the concept of objectivity is in a crisis in science and
the law. In both domains, the term is multiply ambiguous, referring to
practitioners, processes, and products. In the scientific context, Heather
Douglas (2004) has identified eight distinct meanings of process ‘ob-
jectivity’ alone, none of which is reducible to any other. And re-
searchers at the Essex Autonomy Project have identified at least six
distinct and mutually irreducible notions of objectivity in the law.1
This ambiguity has provoked searing deflationary critiques in both
domains. To take a prominent example from the philosophy of science,
Ian Hacking (2015) argues that objectivity is a useless “elevator con-
cept” – by which he means a high-level philosophical concept, rather
than a grounded one used by practitioners – and that we should stop
talking about it. To do worthwhile work on issues traditionally dis-
cussed under the heading of objectivity, he contends, philosophers
should do ground-level analysis that targets the specific epistemic
‘vices’ that afflict researchers in their everyday practice, such as bias or
the corrupting influence of funding from interested third parties.
In the law, deflationary critiques have been even harsher. Catharine
MacKinnon (1991), for instance, argues that “objectivity” has long
served as a legal tool of oppression, because its lack of specific content
allowed it to be co-opted as a stand-in for white male values. On her
view, objectivity not only lacks cognitive content, but it functions as an
instrument of injustice.
Despite these forceful deflationary critiques, the concept of objec-
tivity continues to do important work in scientific and legal practice. In
science, we rely on a division of epistemic labour, and objectivity al-
lows that practice to persist. No one person can know everything, so we
divide the epistemic tasks between us (Kitcher, 2011, pp. 21–22;
Goldberg, 2011). To maintain this division of epistemic work, we need
to trust that individual knowers and knowledge-production groups have
done their tasks well, and that we can trust their results. Objectivity is
the endorsement that we can trust the knowledge produced by others
(Grasswick, 2010; Schemann, 2011) and thus allows us to continue this
vital social practice. Scheman (2011) and Grasswick (2010) speak of
larger audiences in the same terms: laypeople should be able to trust the
outcomes of science. Objectivity assures them that such trust is war-
ranted. The epistemic authority of science thus rests on its claims to
objectivity (Koskinen, 2018; Reiss & Sprenger, 2017).
Objectivity serves similar functions in the law. The legal process
also depends on a division of labour wherein different legal actors
perform distinct tasks. For that process to work, judges, juries, expert
witnesses and others must rely on each other to perform their tasks free
from judgment-distorting factors like biases and conflicts of interests.
Objectivity is the endorsement that we can trust them to have done so.
Moreover, objectivity also enables the wider public to place its trust in
the legal system. Hobbes (1651/1994) argued that the State exists so we
can hand over our arduous individual claims to law enforcement to a
third party. We need not endorse the Hobbesian account to accept that
we participate in formal legal processes, rather than taking them on
ourselves (like vigilante groups might), because we trust the legal
system. In this vein, Postema (2001) argues that the law rests on le-
gitimacy – on “the allegiance of all citizens” – and that this requires
objectivity (p. 101). The normative practical authority of the law thus
rests on its claims to objectivity.
In science and law, then, the concept of objectivity is ambiguous,
subject to deflationary critiques, and yet continues to do important
work. Given this shared predicament, we propose a shared rescue
strategy. Specifically, we extend Inkeri Koskinen's (2018) risk account
of objectivity in science and apply it to the law. Koskinen argues that we
call practitioners, processes, and products of science objective – and so
we trust them and believe that they warrant our trust – when they
identify and manage certain important epistemic risks. This unifies the
fragmented discourse on objectivity in the philosophy of science under
the heading of epistemic risk management, and thus resolves the am-
biguity that provides some of the fuel for deflationary responses. We
endorse Koskinen's view and attempt to tailor it to the issues at stake in
the legal context. To do so, we develop a novel notion of phronetic risk,
and argue that we call practitioners, processes, and products of law
objective when they identify and manage certain important epistemic
and/or phronetic risks. Our hope is that this will likewise bring unity to
an otherwise fragmented discourse, and, ultimately, help resolve the
kinds of disputes we mentioned at the outset.
2. Koskinen's epistemic risk account
The ideal of objectivity has an ontological and epistemological as-
pect. The ontological aspect is concerned with the objective world, the
world as it is unmarred by subjective distortions—an “absolute con-
ception” of reality (Williams, 1985) grasped, so to speak, from a God's
eye view, or “a view from nowhere” (Nagel, 1986). The epistemological
aspect, on the other hand, deals with the normative standards that
govern our efforts to know the world.
In keeping with a trend in recent philosophy of science to view
science as a practice carried out by imperfect human agents for the sake
of human ends and interests, much recent work on the ideal of objec-
tivity sets the ontological aspect of objectivity aside. When you see
science as a practice organized around the interests of imperfect human
agents, the notion of “carving the mind-independent world at its mind-
independent joints” starts to look overly ambitious (Elgin, 2017, p.
151). Setting the ontological question aside, this recent work focuses
instead on constructing an epistemically normative ideal of objectivity
via an analysis of the various ways actual scientists use the term “ob-
jectivity” in practice. We draw inspiration from Koskinen's (2018) im-
portant work in this vein.
Here are some of the ways Koskinen finds contemporary philoso-
phers of science using the term objectivity: they treat objective claims
as fallible; they think of objectivity not as an on/off concept but rather
as something that comes in degrees; they allow for great variety in what
can be objective, e.g., processes, people, claims, and communities; they
deploy the term differently across disciplines, projects, and contexts;
and their efforts to ensure objectivity likewise vary according to their
current aims and context. To give a taste of this latter variety, Koskinen
mentions three identified by Douglas (2004): 1) convergent objectivi-
ty—when researchers reach the same results via different means, 2)
procedural objectivity—when a process allows for one researcher to be
replaced by another without altering the result, and 3) interactive ob-
jectivity—when a research community fosters lively and diverse critical
exchanges.
Next, Koskinen argues that we can unify this diversity with a “risk
account of objectivity.” Her argument begins with a basic fact of human
finitude: our imperfections as epistemic agents make our efforts to ac-
quire knowledge subject to risks of error, i.e., epistemic risks. In science
there are many important epistemic risks, but the ones we have in mind
when we talk about objectivity are risks of error that we are profoundly
and consistently prone to due to our frailties as epistemic agents, e.g.,
idiosyncrasies, illusions, cognitive biases, collective biases, and the like.
Objectivity, according to Koskinen, assures listeners that they can rely
on the products of science because “important epistemic risks arising
from our imperfections as epistemic agents have been effectively
averted” (p.1). Thus, on Koskinen's account, when a speaker calls a
scientific practitioner or a piece of science objective, she indicates that
at least one of these important epistemic risks arising from our im-
perfections as epistemic agents has been recognised and measures have
been taken to mitigate it. This doesn't mean that objective science is
1 Members of the Essex Autonomy Project presented these findings in
February of 2017 at the Policy Institute at King's College for the first event
associated with the Mental Health and Justice project, a multi-disciplinary re-
search initiative funded by the Wellcome Trust. Wayne Martin, Matt Burch, and
Sándor Gurbai prepared the public policy lab on objectivity.
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infallible, just that best efforts have been made to avert certain factors
that are likely to take us further away from the truth. Sometimes, in
actual fact, scientists will still have gone wrong. However, it will still be
your best bet to accept objective science, because it is more likely to be
right than the alternatives, where these kinds of epistemic risks have
not been managed. You should still rely on the science, even though it is
fallible.
The risk account of objectivity captures many of the ways that
historians (Daston & Galison, 2007) and philosophers of science
(Douglas, 2004) have identified scientists using the term. Objective
claims are fallible, because our attempts to manage epistemic risks can
fail, e.g., we can overlook some epistemic risk, we can make an error in
calculation, and so on. Objectivity comes in degrees because some
practice P1 can mitigate epistemic risk R better than practice P2, while
both practices do a pretty good job. There's great variety in what can be
objective, because processes, people, claims, communities, and many
other things can avert important epistemic risks arising from our im-
perfect epistemic agency. The way we describe and achieve objectivity
varies significantly across disciplines, projects, and contexts, because
different situations pose different epistemic risks. Finally, our efforts to
ensure objectivity vary because different strategies avert different
epistemic risks. For example, interactive objectivity – those communal
aspects of scientific processes, such as peer-review and scientific debate
– mitigate individual and collective sources of bias. Say an individual
scientist has biased views on lung cancer that are fuelled by Big To-
bacco funding. The practices that constitute interactive objectivity will
subject his claims to multiple sources of critical scrutiny and so make it
difficult for him get his biased views past the checks of the scientific
community. According to Koskinen, what we see in the case of inter-
active objectivity applies to every type of objectivity identified by au-
thors like Douglas: each one manages particular epistemic risks.
In this way, Koskinen unifies the fragmented discourse on objec-
tivity in science under the heading of epistemic risk management, and
she thereby rescues the scientific conception of objectivity from pro-
tracted disputes about its nature and merits. A similar rescue strategy is
appropriate for objectivity in the law, but it requires that we think more
expansively about the risks at play.
3. A risk account of objectivity fit for law
Much of the philosophical discourse on legal objectivity treats the
law's objectivity as a question of its determinacy, maintaining that the
law is objective insofar as it determines “uniquely correct outcomes” in
actual or hypothetical cases (Brink, 2001, p. 65). Put otherwise, legal
decisions are objective if and only if they achieve the result that the law
really requires. This notion of ‘the one determinate correct answer’
serves as legal philosophy's analogue to the view from nowhere in
philosophy of science. The best-known version of this approach is Ro-
nald Dworkin's “right answer thesis” which maintains that most legal
cases – even hard cases – have objectively correct determinate answers.
And, as Dworkin (1986) argues in Law's Empire and elsewhere, the
correct answer to a legal dispute offers the best fit with the law's in-
stitutional history and the best moral justification of that history. Thus,
for Dworkin, objectivity in law depends not just on the objectivity of
legal interpretation but also on the objectivity of morality, i.e., “an
independent, subsisting realm of moral facts” (Dworkin, 1996, p. 97).
Other legal philosophers defend the view of legal objectivity as
determinacy, while rejecting the link Dworkin forges between law and
morality. Brian Leiter, for example, argues that if we tie objectivity to
moral realism, few will buy it, because an absolute conception of
morality is a hard sell. Leiter still insists that an objective conception of
law requires determinate answers, but he proposes a naturalistic al-
ternative to Dworkin's approach. According to Leiter, we should base
our determinate correct answers to legal questions not on non-natural
moral facts but rather on a “metaphysically objective” realm of “legal
facts” (Leiter, 2002, p. 969) that, like the objects of nature, are
“objective in the sense of being ‘mind-independent’ and causally effi-
cacious” (Leiter, 2001, p. 67).
Whether it's grounded in Dworkin's moral realism or Leiter's nat-
uralism, this approach to legal objectivity strikes us as overly ambi-
tious. If legal objectivity demands that we attend faithfully to the mind-
independent moral and/or legal facts to determine uniquely correct
answers to legal disputes, then it demands too much. Why think that
there's a uniquely correct determinate answer to nearly every legal
question? The law, after all, is a contingent and frequently messy his-
torical practice organized around the evolving interests of imperfect
human agents; and the situations to which we apply the law are often
just as complicated and messy. Moreover, to understand objectivity as
determinacy is to treat it as an on/off concept—you either determine
the uniquely correct answer to the legal dispute, or you don't. And this
leaves no room for the sort of comparisons, familiar to legal practice,
between more and less objective decisions, judges, and procedures.
Moreover, it rules out the possibility that legal actors can make judg-
ments that are both objective and fallible. Like the view from nowhere
in the philosophy of science, then, this looks like objectivity fit for gods,
not limited imperfect agents engaged in a practice organized around
specific cultural and historical human interests.
Indeed, critics have reacted to the determinacy view of objectivity
precisely along these lines. For instance, authors from Critical Legal
Studies like Roberto Unger (1986) have argued that if objectivity re-
quires determinacy, then objectivity is beyond our reach, because
there's always room for rational indeterminacy when we seek to apply
an abstract body of law – in light of its institutional history – to the facts
of a particular case. Many scholars and legal practitioners agree: if
objectivity in law depends on a) the existence of mind-independent
moral and/or legal facts and b) our ability to know those facts, then it's
an unattainable ideal and we would be better off if we just stopped
talking about it.
We propose another way forward. We agree with Leiter that we
should take our cue from the natural sciences when developing a con-
cept of legal objectivity (2001, p. 67); but our agreement stops there,
because we think Leiter latches on to the wrong model of scientific
objectivity. Instead of pursuing an analogue to the view from nowhere,
we should follow the lead of more recent work in philosophy of science.
We should set aside ontological questions about some objective realm
of moral and/or legal facts and concentrate instead on developing an
epistemically and practically normative account of objectivity. And we
should develop that account not in terms of some abstract conception of
the law but rather in relation to the ways actual legal practitioners use
the term objectivity. To develop such an account, we adapt Koskinen's
risk account of objectivity to the legal context.
Given her interest in scientific objectivity, Koskinen naturally fo-
cuses strictly on the epistemic risks that objective science averts. But
objectivity isn't a purely epistemic ideal. It also plays a role in a range of
other contexts – e.g., morality, politics, and law (Nussbaum, 2001;
Shafer, 2003; Sibley, 2001) – where the stakes are decidedly non-
epistemic. So when we talk about legal objectivity, we mean something
broader than epistemic risk management.
How should we think of the non-epistemic risks posed by the legal
context? Biddle and Kukla (2017) provide a clue. Although they also
focus exclusively on knowledge production, Biddle and Kukla identify a
broad range of risks that are not strictly epistemic but nevertheless bear
on our epistemic practices. Philosophers of science have long-accepted
that moving from a body of evidence to a hypothesis involves risk – the
so-called problem of ‘inductive risk’ (Rudner, 1953). Biddle and Kukla
argue further that risk in knowledge production is more ubiquitous,
involving everything from model selection through to how particular
phenomena are classified. They describe this more expansive notion of
risk as ‘phronetic risk’, which they define as “epistemic risks that arise
during the course of activities that are preconditions for or parts of
empirical (inductive or abductive) reasoning” (p. 220). Such risks arise,
then, when researchers must deliberate in light of their values and
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interests in order to make calls that are fateful for the balance of
epistemic risks.
We want to expand this category of phronetic risk to tailor
Koskinen's risk account of objectivity to the legal context. When we
speak of objectivity in the law, we are most often concerned not just
with accurate knowledge acquisition strategies but rather with the
normative requirements of practical reason. Consider a few examples.
We claim that divorce proceedings are objective when the legal deci-
sions that determine the outcome treat all relevant parties fairly; ob-
jectivity here thus averts the risk of our practical reasoning failing to
track the normative requirement of fairness that we associate with
justice. To take another example, we say that a judge's decision fails to
be objective when it's shaped by racial bias; objectivity in his case
would have averted the risks of personal bias and racial animus af-
fecting his reasoning and decision-making. Finally, when a witness on
Big Pharma's payroll testifies to the moral integrity of the CEO who runs
her company, we might doubt her objectivity, as objectivity on her part
would require her to prevent a considerable conflict of interests from
distorting her appraisal of her boss's character. In these examples, we
see legal actors running the risk of getting things wrong, but the risks at
play, at least principally, are not epistemic. For the most part, we're not
worried that an attempt to produce knowledge will go wrong in these
cases; rather, the relevant risks represent threats to practical reasoning.
These examples are undoubtedly concerned with phronetic risk, then,
but not of the sort of epistemic-phronetic risk that Biddle, Kukla and
Koskinen have in mind. These examples from the law are not targeting a
sub-category of epistemic risks, but rather a class of risks that are
strictly phronetic, i.e., risks of getting things wrong in our practical
reasoning.
We thus need to extend the notion of phronetic risk beyond epis-
temic concerns to cover the wider range of risks encountered in the
practical reasoning of the legal system. To articulate this broader notion
of phronetic risk, we turn briefly to Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. In
that work, Aristotle identifies five intellectual virtues. One of them is
epistēme, which, as most readers will know, is typically translated as
knowledge (or scientific knowledge), and from which the term epis-
temic derives. Hence, epistemic risks threaten our efforts to acquire
knowledge. Another intellectual virtue Aristotle names there is
phronēsis, which is typically translated as practical wisdom or practical
intelligence, and from which we derive the term phronetic. Phronēsis
does a lot of important work in Aristotle's virtue ethical theory, but we
will narrowly tailor our discussion of the concept to our current con-
cerns.
Phronēsis denotes the human capacity for “concretely situation-
specific discernment” (McDowell, 2007, p. 340). According to Aristotle,
without this capacity one cannot live a virtuous life. For, he argues,
even if we get lucky, and we're naturally endowed with virtuous im-
pulses, and our upbringing habituates us to seek the good and teaches
us our culture's code of conduct, without phronēsis, we will still be apt
to go wrong with respect to the demands of virtue. Why? Because doing
the right thing isn't simply a matter of rule-following; as Aristotle
(2000) famously argues, right action requires that we act “at the right
times, with reference to the right objects, and to the right people”
(110b21–22). Think of it this way. You can teach a child with a good
disposition and good habits that justice is “the constant and perpetual
will to render each his due” (Institutes of Justinian)2; but you cannot
thereby expect the child to know how to render each person her due
across the vast range of diverse and evolving concrete circumstances
that life presents us with. Such situation-specific discernment requires
the practical intelligence to a) move from general rules to specific cir-
cumstances; b) descry the morally salient features of novel and ever-
shifting situations; c) discern which course of action (or set of actions)
the available reasons best support; and d) discover and know how to
secure efficient means to achieve that course of action (or set of ac-
tions). And she must do all this in a way that is sensitive to and con-
strained by the relevant moral considerations. This is the work of
phronēsis. It is the capacity to make context-sensitive calls about the
best course of action across a range of variable, dynamic concrete cir-
cumstances.3 Such calls are risky, because even the most skilful prac-
tical reasoners can get them wrong. Moreover, going wrong in such
cases is not a matter of failing to formulate accurate knowledge claims;
rather, it's a matter of failing to discern what the situation calls for
morally and practically speaking. Thus, the risks that threaten our
ability to get this sort of call right are not epistemic but rather phro-
netic.
If epistemic risk is “any risk of epistemic error that arises anywhere
during knowledge practices” (Biddle & Kukla, 2017, p. 218); phronetic
risk, as we conceive it, is any risk of error that arises during practical
reasoning about the correct judgment to make and the best course of
action to take. Just as epistemic risks represent a hurdle to science
achieving its theoretical aims, especially its paramount aim of truth,
phronetic risks pose a hindrance to the law achieving its guiding
practical aims, especially its highest aim of justice. Moreover, just as
objective science continually faces and mitigates diverse epistemic
risks, objective legal practice continually faces and mitigates diverse
epistemic and phronetic risks.4 Finally, in the scientific context, we saw
that objectivity is concerned with managing important epistemic risks
that we're subject to profoundly and consistently because they arise
from our imperfections as knowers. The same is true in the case of
phronetic risks: the ones objective legal practice strives to avert arise
from our imperfections as practical reasoners.
As knowers and deliberators, we aim to get things right in theory
and practice. To do so, we must avert the important epistemic and
phronetic risks that stand in our way. Some of these important epis-
temic and phronetic risks arise from our imperfections as epistemic and
practical agents. Objectivity is the assurance that at least some of these
latter risks have been managed.5
With this expanded account of phronetic risk in view, we propose
that objectivity in the law is the assurance that measures have been
taken to manage the epistemic and phronetic risks of error inherent in
legal practice. Objectivity is a self-responsible stance that strives to
identify and avert epistemic and phronetic risks that arise from our
imperfections as agents. Such a risk account of legal objectivity will
have all the virtues of its scientific corollary. First, it allows for objec-
tive legal claims to be fallible, which is attractive given the inherent
fallibility of human judges and other legal actors. Second, it entails that
objectivity is not an on/off concept but rather comes in degrees, which
allows us to compare judges, procedures, and outcomes along a con-
tinuum of objectivity. Third, it allows us to account for the great variety
of things in the law that are said to be objective: evidence; expert
witnesses; judges and their decisions; the jury and its verdicts; proce-
dures; standards; legislative bodies; and the legal system itself. These
things can all be objective, but they are so in their own way, because
2 Cited in Miller (2017). The Institutes of Justinian is a codification of Roman
Law from 6th c. AD.
3 For a lucid discussion of the intellectual virtue of phronēsis, see McMullin
(2018, pp. 110–114).
4 Indeed, in most cases the law must avert many phronetic risks as once. For
instance, in the child protection cases that Munro and Hardie (2018) in their
recent work on objectivity, when the Family Court makes assessments about
whether an at-risk child should remain with their family or be placed in care,
the Court must simultaneously manage risks that have to do with our limited
abilities to forecast future outcomes, the social value we place on keeping fa-
milies intact, the potential physical harms to the child, and to treating all the
relevant parties (parents, the child, other caregivers) with appropriate concern,
amongst other risks.
5 From here on, when we refer to important epistemic/phronetic risks,
readers can assume that we mean important epistemic/phronetic risks that arise
from our imperfections as epistemic agents/practical reasoners.
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they avert different epistemic and/or phronetic risks. Finally, this ap-
proach allows us to tailor our understanding of what objectivity de-
mands to our current aims and context, because the epistemic and/or
phronetic risks we face will vary with our aims and context.6 Im-
portantly, the language of ‘phronetic risk management’ is not intended
to imply anything approximating a ‘check boxing’ approach to risk, or
any managerial bureaucratic oversight. Rather, drawing on our earlier
discussion of Aristotle, we conceive of this as a type of practical
wisdom.
In the second half of this paper, we change pace somewhat. We
follow Koskinen's procedure by identifying some of the products, per-
sons, and processes that actual legal practitioners deem objective and
indicating which epistemic and/or phronetic risks they avert. There are
undoubtedly more types of objectivity and associated risks in the law
than we will identify here, and still more will likely emerge in the fu-
ture. After all, as Koskinen notes, the risks a community deems salient
change over time. Our aim here is not to offer an exhaustive list, but
rather an indicative one that illustrates how a risk account of objectivity
would function in the legal context. We did not, however, construct our
list at random; rather, we selected certain types of objectivity and
epistemic/phronetic risks due to their prevalence in current legal
practice. Indeed, we think it's hard to imagine how a legal system could
make claims to objectivity without managing the epistemic and phro-
netic risks we discuss below. To continue our comparison between
scientific and legal objectivity, we will introduce each type of legal
objectivity with a quick look at its scientific analogue.
4. Types of objectivity and the risks they manage
4.1. Hermeneutic objectivity
The contemporary philosophical concern with epistemic risk man-
agement began with the problem of inductive risk, i.e., the problem of
moving from a body of data to a unique interpretation (Rudner, 1953).
That move involves potential ethical, phronetic, and epistemic risks.
For example, imagine a public health context where accepting hy-
pothesis H1 might lead to 1000 deaths, while accepting H2 might lead to
1000 people experiencing slight discomfort. Accepting either hypoth-
esis involves ethical risks, i.e., risks of harm, but we would demand a
higher degree of certainty to accept H1 because the ethical stakes are
higher. Moreover, the move from data to interpretation in this case also
involves managing phronetic risks, because we have to make a practical
moral judgment about the balance of those ethical risks, and we could
get that call wrong. Finally, there are also epistemic risks to consider.
The very fact that we are not dealing with deduction but rather making
an inductive move that involves degrees of probability makes us vul-
nerable to the risk of epistemic error. One of the ways objective science
manages such epistemic risks is via interpretative norms. For instance,
consider the standardisation of p-values, i.e., the standard that 5%
significance is required to reject the null hypothesis and accept your
own hypothesis. As Parascandola (2010) argues, such p-value stan-
dardisation is an epistemic risk management strategy.7 The scientific
community agrees on a standard p-value to offset worries about un-
certainty in each new case.
An analogue to inductive risk runs through the practice of legal
interpretation. When judges decide a case, for instance, they must bring
legal norms, moral principles, and the law's institutional history to bear
on the concrete particulars of a case. Like the move from data to in-
terpretation in science, this hermeneutic move from the law to the facts
of the case is shot through with uncertainty. Not only is there often a
low probability of a unique, determinate, and correct interpretation of a
case in light of our legal norms, moral principles, and the actual in-
stitutional history of the law. But it is even less likely that an imperfect
limited agent will actually know what that uniquely correct inter-
pretation is. In the words of former Chief Justice of England, Lord
Bingham, “when you are deciding a case you usually feel that there is a
choice of answers… …To say that there is one right answer and one
wrong answer is just not at all how it feels.”8 This uncertainty makes
the move from the law to the particulars of a case risky. The move
almost always involves ethical risks – i.e., risks of harm to others –
because legal decisions tend to have real-world consequences. More-
over, moving from the body of law to a particular case also always
involves phronetic risks: we can go wrong with respect to the normative
practical requirements of the law. For example, there's the phronetic
risk of interpreting the law in a way that leads to an unjust decision, or
a decision that is less just than a viable alternative would be.
Objective judges acknowledge these phronetic risks inherent in the
hermeneutic process and take steps to avert them. This includes relying
on techniques that are analogous to the interpretative norms of science
just discussed (Eskridge & Ferejohn, 1994; Knight & Johnson, 1994).
One example of an interpretative strategy designed to mitigate phro-
netic risk is the principle of stare decisis, or the requirement that judicial
precedent be given interpretative priority. When judges prioritise pre-
cedence in this way, we have more reason to trust them to interpret the
law in similar ways in similar cases (Foster, 2008). This averts an ob-
vious ethical risk—for it would be unjust to hold people accountable to
unpredictable laws. But the practice also manages phronetic risks, e.g.,
when judges are tempted to make idiosyncratic calls or to “legislate
from the bench” on the basis of pet ideologies, the practice of prior-
itising precedence anchors their reasoning in the common law and a
shared history of interpretation that tempers their personal take on
things. Again, this is an instance of phronetic, rather than epistemic,
risk management—we don't expect that adhering to precedent will get
us closer to the ‘true’ interpretation of the law, only that it guards
against risks like idiosyncrasy and individual bias.
4.2. Procedural objectivity
Earlier we touched on procedural objectivity in science, i.e., when a
process allows for one researcher to be replaced by another without
altering the result. With procedural objectivity, scientists rely on
methodological procedures to avert the epistemic risks of idiosyncrasy
and individual bias. Daston and Galison (2007) famously describe
‘mechanical objectivity’ along these lines:
By mechanical objectivity we mean the insistent drive to repress the
willful intervention of the artist-author, and to put in its stead a set
of procedures that would, as it were, move nature to the page
through a strict protocol, if not automatically
(Daston & Galison, 2007, p. 121).
The idea, then, is that such procedures eliminate distortions that
stem from the scientist's own subjective contribution to her observa-
tions and thereby enhances her focus on the objects she observes.
Moreover, the fact that any other scientist could follow the procedure
and attain the same results suggests that it successfully manages the
epistemic risks associated with subjective distortions like idiosyncrasy
and individual bias. If multiple researchers reach the same result, then
it's less likely that any idiosyncrasies or biases specific to them as
6 “Context” in the law means that what will be relevant will vary on a case-by-
case basis. Philosophy of science typically draws a distinction between the
context in which knowledge is produced and the context in which it us used
(Montuschi, 2016, 60), but given the deeply applied nature of the law, all
contexts are contexts of use.
7 Parascandola goes on to argue that p-value standardisation creates addi-
tional risks, and so is ultimately not successful. But our point was to highlight
how scientists use interpretative norms to manage epistemic risks, not to assess
the value of a particular standard.
8 This remark is cited in Guest (2007, p. 100) and comes from Susskind
(2005).
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individuals have distorted that result. Finally, strict protocols also
prevent the scientist from inadvertently introducing a change to the
process that affects the outcome.
In the law, procedural objectivity plays an analogous role. Some
legal procedures principally aim to manage epistemic risks. The Law of
Evidence, for instance, focuses on averting epistemic risks by ensuring
that legal actors follow appropriate procedures in acquiring the evi-
dence that appears before the Court. As Alvin Goldman (2005) notes,
it's generally held that one of the principal aims – if not the principal
aim – of evidence-handling procedures is to promote “the accurate or
truthful determination of facts relevant to the case at hand” (p.164). For
example, proper procedures of evidence management require that re-
levant parties handle evidence in a way that leaves no significant room
for doubt that someone could have accidentally altered or deliberately
tampered with the evidence. The analogy to procedural objectivity in
science is clear. Just as a strict experimental protocol is designed to
prevent an individual scientist from introducing changes to the process
that affect the results, following a strict evidence-handling procedure in
criminal cases assures us, to a reasonable degree, that no one has cor-
rupted or substituted the evidence in a manner that leads us away from
a truthful determination of the facts. In our terms, then, these proce-
dures contribute to the law's objectivity by helping us avert important
epistemic risks.9
Other parts of the law use procedures predominantly to manage
phronetic risks. The proceduralisation of the judicial process aims to
allow for one legal actor to be replaced by another without significantly
altering the result. This provides a useful lens to understand procedural
rights and our highly proceduralised court hearings. For example,
consider some of the procedural characteristics that Jeremy Waldron
(2011) deems indispensable to the rule of law. According to Waldron,
the government should not impose any “penalty, stigma or serious loss”
on someone without procedures that involve:
A. A hearing by an impartial tribunal that is required to act on the basis
of evidence and argument presented formally before it in relation to
legal norms that govern the imposition of penalty, stigma, loss etc.;
B. A legally-trained judicial officer, whose independence of other
agencies of government is assured;
C. A right to representation by counsel and to the time and opportunity
required to prepare a case;
D. A right to be present at all critical stages of the proceeding (2011, p.
6).10
These procedural characteristics clearly aim to manage the phronetic
risks of making biased, discriminatory, and/or arbitrary decisions. The
basic idea is that no matter who you are, and whatever your personal
characteristics, the law's procedures exist to ensure that you receive the
same treatment as anyone else not relevantly different from you. In other
words, such procedures are designed to prevent legal actors from imposing
their idiosyncrasies and biases on the legal proceedings. In both the sci-
entific and the legal context, then, the emphasis on procedures is a way to
manage the epistemic and/or phronetic risks that individual practitioners
might intentionally or inadvertently contaminate evidence or impose their
personal quirks and biases on the process.
4.3. Objectivity as independence of judgment
Another strategy for managing epistemic risk in science is the attempt
to maintain independence of judgment. It's well known that funding from
interested third parties tends to skew research results towards those par-
ties' interests; and, correlatively, we also know that the best evidence tends
to come from studies conducted by scientists who operate independently
of such interested parties. For example, as Stegenga (2018) notes, the most
accurate and reliable randomized controlled trials and systematic reviews
to test medical interventions are typically carried out by “academics who
are independent of the manufactures of the medical interventions in
question” (p. 2). When researchers have an interest in the outcome of
scientific research, they tend to err on the side of that interest, which quite
often takes them away from the truth. The scientific community thus
promotes strategies designed to avert this epistemic risk, such as requiring
researchers to declare their funding sources and other conflicts of interests.
These strategies aim to mitigate idiosyncrasy, bias, and motivated rea-
soning, and to encourage other members of the scientific community to
closely scrutinise the research results.
The law also treats independence of judgment as an essential strategy
to manage phronetic risk. Notice what Waldron puts second on his list of
indispensable procedural characteristics: a “legally-trained judicial officer,
whose independence of other agencies of government is assured”. This
aims to assure the person before the law that the outcome will not be
predetermined by third party interests that are normatively irrelevant to
the adjudication of her specific case. But independence of judgment does
not just require distance from the interests of third parties; it also requires
that persons involved take measures to prevent their own personal inter-
ests from affecting their judgment. We can understand anti-sympathy in-
struction for jurors in this light. For example, consider California v. Brown
(1987) wherein the trial court instructs jurors not make their decision
based on “mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice,
public opinion or public feeling.” We see a similar concern addressed by
the Court of Protection of England and Wales in CC v KK and STCC (2012),
as Justice Baker writes,
[T]here is a risk that all professionals involved with treating and
helping that person – including, of course, a judge in the Court of
Protection – may feel drawn towards an outcome that is more pro-
tective of the adult and thus, in certain circumstances, fail to carry
out an assessment of capacity that is detached and objective. On the
other hand, the court must be equally careful not to be influenced by
sympathy for a person's wholly understandable wish to return home
(par. 25, emphasis added).
This passage identifies two potential personal interests – the urge to
protect a person and sympathy for her wishes – that, in our terms, pose
phronetic risks that judges and others involved in such cases must
manage with what Justice Baker characterizes as a detached and ob-
jective stance. Again, independent judgment requires independence not
just from the interests of third parties but also from one's own interests,
however noble or sensitive their underlying motives may be.
Whether motivated by group-interest or self-interest, conflicts of
interest are inimical to independence of judgment, as they motivate the
agent to decide on behalf of her group or herself, rather than attending
to normatively relevant facts, reasons, and arguments. If a judge has a
personal or social stake in the outcome of a case, those involved might
naturally worry about her potential lack of impartiality.11 If a juror
can't regard the defendant without prejudice, then the latter will not be
9 Of course, as Goldman also points out, not all evidence-handling procedures
aim at truth. For instance, exclusionary rules make illegally obtained evidence
inadmissible, even though such evidence might lead to a more truthful de-
termination of the facts. This does not, however, make the law less objective. It
just highlights the fact that strategies designed to manage epistemic risks must
simultaneously manage relevant ethical and phronetic risks. Courts do not
admit illegally obtained evidence because of the associated ethical risks, e.g.,
doing so might incentivize criminal behavior amongst people trying to win a
case. However, in defining what constitutes illegally obtained evidence, the law
also has to manage phronetic risks, e.g., the risk of making the wrong call when
balancing the value of a more truthful determination of the facts against the
ethical risks just mentioned.
10 This is only part of Waldron's list but we thought it sufficient to make our
point.
11 For discussions of the problem of conflicts of interest in relation to objec-
tivity see Harding (1992) or Resnik (1998).
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able to trust the former's reasoning and ability to follow the evidence
where it leads. Procedures, protocols, and instructions designed to
promote independence of judgment thus contribute to the law's objec-
tivity by managing the phronetic risks of partiality and conflicts of in-
terest that could lead the process of legal reasoning away from a nor-
matively correct judgment.
4.4. Objectivity as publicity, or deliberative objectivity
Earlier we mentioned interactive objectivity in science, which ob-
tains when a research community fosters lively and diverse critical
exchanges. This type of critical, argumentative activity aims to mitigate
risks of idiosyncrasy as well as individual and collective biases
(Longino, 1990). It's clear enough how critical dialogue manages idio-
syncrasy and individual bias: it allows the community to identify and
eliminate merely personal takes on the available evidence. How a cri-
tical exchange uncovers collective bias, however, is less obvious. Col-
lective biases, after all, are shared, and so they tend to operate as
background assumptions that shape the group's conversations; however
critical their exchanges may be, then, it's unclear what mechanism
could reliably bring such shared background assumptions into view.
This highlights the importance of outsiders for interactive objec-
tivity, a point that has gained theoretical prominence with the devel-
opment of Standpoint Theory in Feminist Philosophy of Science.
Standpoint theories, such as Harding (1991) and Wylie (2003), hold
that the “view from nowhere” or the so-called “value-free ideal” is
impossible. Instead, they argue that all knowledge is from a particular
perspective and advocate for more diverse scientific communities, be-
cause looking at the evidence from different social and political per-
spectives may allow for different factors to become more or less salient
(Wylie, 2003). As an example of this, consider the case of early AIDS
science as described by Steven Epstein in Impure Science (1996). AIDS
was initially aetiologically mysterious, but the initial framing of AIDS
was that it must be caused by some aspect of the ‘gay-lifestyle’ (rather
than being an infectious disease with a microbial cause), focusing in on
the most sensationalised aspects of the lifestyles of men in the ‘urban
American gay-scene’ (e.g., promiscuity and drug use), and thus dis-
missing evidence that ran counter to the hypothesis that it must be life-
style related; such as the monogamous gay men, heterosexual men and
women, and children who presented with AIDS (Epstein, 1996, pp.
48–50). Ultimately it was microbiology and the discovery of the HIV
virus, not diversifying the scientific community, that put us on the right
causal track, but this provides a cautionary tale of the dangers of
looking at the evidence from one social/political perspective. Thus, the
example constitutes a negative illustration of the importance of inter-
active objectivity. Consider a related positive illustration: later in the
1980s, when treatment first became available, mainstream science had
to consult members of the AIDS activist community, because they had
become the experts, as those living with the disease, and this per-
spectival knowledge was essential for successfully developing treatment
(Epstein, 1996).
In the legal context, the analogue to interactive objectivity is what
legal philosophers call ‘objectivity as publicity’ or ‘deliberative objec-
tivity.’ On Postema's (2001) compelling account of this form of objec-
tivity, a judgment is objectively correct if and only if it can be justified
by public practical reason. The basic idea is that deliberative objectivity
holds for practical reasoning procedures and their outcomes when they
are acceptable to all (in practice or in principle). Thus, we achieve
deliberative objectivity when we arrive at judgments through a public,
deliberative process that fully considers and assesses the available and
normatively relevant arguments and reasons. Under the best circum-
stances, we can see this kind of deliberative objectivity at work in the
jury process, law consultations, and legal argumentation.
Like interactive objectivity, deliberative objectivity aims to mitigate
risks of idiosyncrasy as well as individual and collective biases. To do so
effectively, however, accounts of deliberative objectivity in the law
need to take a cue from Feminist Philosophy of Science and its emphasis
on perspectival diversity. To achieve a truly robust deliberative con-
sensus, it's not enough that a claim be “maximally supported by the
arguments and the balance of reasons available for articulation and
assessment by reasonable and competent persons in a fully public de-
liberative process” (Postema, 2001, p. 117). Such maximal argu-
mentative support is not enough because which reasons are “available
for articulation and assessment” hinges crucially on which people we
include in the deliberative process. Again, critical exchange might
eliminate idiosyncrasy and individual bias, but it's unlikely to root out
collective bias unless the group hears the voices of outsiders. Otherwise,
the homogeneity of legal practitioners can obscure collective biases at
work in the legal system.
Consider, for example, the case of Buck v. Bell (1927) in which the
United States Supreme Court upheld a Virginia circuit court ruling that
the state should sterilise Carrie Buck, a young, poor, single mother,
falsely alleged to be “feebleminded.” At the time, the Supreme Court
had several enthusiastic supporters of eugenics on the bench, including
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wrote the Court's opinion. Under such
conditions, a critical evaluation of available reasons and arguments falls
short. Had the conversation included the voices of women, people
living in poverty, and/or people with disabilities, the Court's collective
bias may have been exposed. Maximal argumentative support is not
enough; diversity of perspectives is also essential to making objectivity
as publicity properly public. Of course, such diversity will never guar-
antee the elimination of collective bias—such a conceit would only lull
us back into the dreamy stupor of the illusory view from nowhere. But
the voices of outsiders remain our best hope for catching sight of the
blind spots that lie hidden in consensus views. This captures some of the
impetus behind the well-known slogan and principle of disability rights
activism, “Nothing About Us Without Us”; many activists believe,
rightly we think, that conversations about disability rights will be in-
flected with collective biases that persons with disabilities are uniquely
positioned to identify, challenge, and correct.12
Despite the analogy between interactive and deliberative objec-
tivity, we should highlight the fact that the former principally manages
epistemic risks, while the latter mitigates phronetic risks. That is, the
former helps us avoid error in knowledge production, while the latter,
as the Buck case illustrates, manages the risk of our practical judgments
falling short of the requirements of justice.13
The intuition behind deliberative objectivity is clear. It rests par-
tially on the notion that one's judgments improve when they must be
defended against critical scrutiny, and partially on the intuition that
one of the virtues of objectivity is transparency. Even Munro and Hardie
(2018), in their criticism of objectivity, accept that the transparency
associated with the term is worth striving for, because it allows others
to check that no biases, idiosyncrasies or malevolent motives have
warped the reasoning process.
4.5. Structural objectivity
Like interactive and deliberative objectivity, structural objectivity
also manages a group-level phronetic risk, but not one that diverse
critical exchanges can do much to manage, i.e., ‘structural biases’.
Structural epistemic biases refer to the ways in which the very structure
of the scientific research environment leads us to neglect the perspec-
tives, stories, and interests of large swathes of society and thereby
skews our knowledge base. To be clear, this is not a problem that is
necessarily solved by just making the research community more
12 See Charlton, 1998.
13 Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice (2007) shows that exclusions of the
views of members from marginalised groups might not just be an epistemic loss,
but may also be an injustice to those excluded. And so even focussing just on the
epistemic may sometimes also involve considerations about justice.
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diverse: diverse scientific research communities can (and many do)
work in structurally biased research environments. Consider, for ex-
ample, the case of neglected diseases, as discussed by Reiss and Kitcher
(2009). Neglected diseases are those that receive a proportionally
smaller share of the available research and biomedical resources re-
lative to their contribution to the global disease burden. Note:
For instance, malaria, pneumonia, diarrhea and tuberculosis to-
gether account for 21% of the global disease burden, but receive
only 0.31% of all public and private funds devoted to health re-
search
(Reiss & Kitcher, 2009, p. 264).
The real-world consequence of this is that many thousands of people
die from diseases that almost exclusively afflict the poorest parts of the
world, many of which have been completely eradicated from more af-
fluent regions. Tuberculosis, for instance, results in 1,566,000 deaths
annually, despite being all-but-eliminated from richer portions of the
world (although, it is still a problem amongst socially and economically
marginalised segments of wealthy countries, such as the United
Kingdom). One major reason that biomedical research neglects diseases
that mostly affect the poor is that large pharmaceutical companies
undertake the majority of that research. The cost of taking a new drug
from initial research to shelf is astronomically large (around $800
million for a single new drug). Since pharmaceutical companies could
never expect to make back this investment in the world's poorest re-
gions, they do not undertake research that is relevant to these places
(Reiss & Kitcher, 2009, pp. 265–267). This is a structural problem that
is unlikely to be addressed by the influx of researchers from more di-
verse backgrounds.
In addition to being an obvious ethical concern, this poses an
epistemic risk, in that we end up with medical knowledge skewed to-
wards one very small segment of the world's population. Moreover,
interactive objectivity can't manage this risk—introduce scientists from
diverse backgrounds into this field of medical research and there still
won't be money for research on neglected diseases. The main safeguard
against this kind of epistemic risk is structural objectivity—the attempt
to change the research environment so that it's not systematically
skewed towards the perspectives, stories, and interests of privileged
members of society. Reiss and Kitcher (2009) suggest that the way to do
it in the case of neglected diseases is to implement Kitcher's suggestions
for ‘well-ordered science’, as outlined in his book Science, Truth and
Democracy (Kitcher, 2001). The details of this suggestion are too
lengthy for us to spell out here, and not directly relevant to our ends.
The point is that philosophers of science take seriously the risk of
structural bias, like that seen in the case of neglected diseases, and they
have suggestions for how we might manage that risk.
In the law, we see an analogous strategy at work, with feminist phi-
losophers once again leading the way. Prominent feminist critiques argue
that the law is not objective because it exhibits structural biases, system-
atically subordinating the interests of women to those of men (Mackinnon,
1983, 1987). Mackinnon, for instance, argues that the ideal of objectivity
is in fact the male point of view masquerading as a “nonsituated, universal
standpoint” (1983, p. 636). The basic claim behind her critique is that the
very structure of the law privileges powerful white men and disadvantages
women, ethnic minorities, persons living in poverty, and persons with
disabilities; and the law deploys the rhetoric of objectivity to cover over
this systemic oppression. If this legal order is simply what objective, value-
neutral reason demands, then it cannot be unjust. In this way, Mackinnon
argues that the language of objectivity “reinforce(s) existing distributions
of power” (1983, p.645). Authors working in Critical Legal Studies (Unger,
1986), Critical Race Theory (Crenshaw, Gotanda, and Peller, 1995), and
Disability Studies (Wolbring, 2008) have similarly argued that the law is
not just structurally sexist but also racist and ableist. Some think this
critique recommends the view that the very ideal of objectivity is corrupt;
but others see it as a call to a deeper and more adequate notion of ob-
jectivity.
People who fight for structural objectivity in the law attempt to change
how the law works, so that it doesn't systematically favour privileged
groups of people. On this view, then, the law exhibits structural objectivity
to the extent that it treats everyone the same unless they are relevantly
different.14 Why is this a matter of objectivity at all and not strictly an
ethical issue of non-discrimination? The basic idea is that a discriminatory
legal system is shaped in light of – and so biased towards – a privileged
form of subjectivity. Moreover, just as a structurally biased research en-
vironment will skew our body of knowledge towards the interests of pri-
vileged groups, so will a structurally biased legal system skew our body of
legal judgments towards the advantage of some groups and the dis-
advantage of others. Whereas a legal systemwherein “all persons are equal
before and under the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection and equal benefit of the law” (UN General Assembly,
2006, Article 5.1.) is objective in the sense that it is not biased towards the
interests of a particular form of subjectivity, and so it should not produce a
body of judgments that systematically helps certain groups and hinders
others. An objective legal system roots out structural biases and treats
everyone the same regardless of their personal characteristics, and by
doing so, it manages some of the deepest risks that legal reasoning will run
afoul of the demands of justice.
4.6. Objective evidence
Finally, we turn to “objective evidence”, a common expression in sci-
entific and legal discourse. Although the nature of evidence is a major
philosophical issue in its own right, we only wish to sketch the link be-
tween objective evidence and epistemic/phronetic risk management.
First, note the basic ambiguity in the scientific use of the expression
“objective evidence”. Sometimes we use the expression as if it refers to a
particular kind of evidence; as though the evidence were objective by its
very nature. What we typically mean by this is that the evidence is publicly
available.15 Such evidence is objective, in our sense, because its public
availability manages certain epistemic risks. Because the evidence is out
there for all to see, we can come at it from different perspectives and
appeal to it as a neutral arbiter when adjudicating disputes. And this in-
tersubjective triangulation on a piece of public evidence mitigates the
epistemic risks of idiosyncrasy and personal blind spots. To be clear, we
are not just talking about procedural or interactive objectivity again. It's
not the researchers' activity alone that makes the evidence objective.
There's something about the evidence itself that makes it objective,
namely, its publicity. Such evidence is objective in a way that, say, purely
private mental experiences are not. Multiple people can see public evi-
dence from different perspectives, and so the very nature of such evidence
mitigates the risk of certain kinds of error.
But we also speak of objective evidence in at least one other way: we
refer to the results of scientific inquiry – the products of science – as
objective evidence. For example, when asked for objective evidence for
the claim that X causes Y, we will likely appeal to empirical research
results meant to demonstrate that causal link, e.g., “You want objective
evidence? Here are 30 RCTs linking X to Y.” In this case, as Elgin (2017)
puts it, “What justifies calling a particular result objective is that it is
the product of an objective procedure” (p. 159). In our terms, the re-
sults of scientific inquiry can count as objective evidence in favour of
some claim, because those results were reached by processes that avert
14 Relevantly different here means that a person is different in such a way that
treating her like everyone else would constitute unfair treatment, e.g., failing to
provide a person with intellectual difficulties with reasonable accommodations
in her education would constitute a failure to treat differently someone who is
relevantly different.
15 For Conee and Feldman (2008) scientific evidence is “publicly available”
by definition (p. 84). We are not sure that all scientific evidence must be
publicly available—after all, introspective reports are private, yet they still
serve as evidence in psychological science. But we agree that publicly available
evidence is especially important in science.
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important epistemic risks. What sort of processes? Exactly the sort
we've discussed thus far: lively critical exchanges, peer review, trian-
gulation, practices that root out conflicts of interest, critical scrutiny of
collective and structural biases, strict experimental protocols, and so
on. Again, we're not just repeating what we've said about other forms of
objectivity here; rather, we're pointing out that results reached via these
various strategies of epistemic risk management earn the label of ob-
jective. Objective evidence in this second sense denotes results we can
rely on because they were reached via strategies that manage epistemic
risk; and we should rely on those results to a degree that matches the
rigor and known reliability of those risk management strategies. Thus,
we have i) evidence that is objective in virtue of its public nature and ii)
evidence that is objective in virtue of the epistemic risk management
strategy by which it was reached.
Objective evidence in the law reflects a similar ambiguity. Much like
the scientific context, the preferred and most powerful form of evidence
in legal practice is publicly available evidence. For example, in criminal
proceedings, prosecutors tend to prefer DNA evidence that places the
defendant at the scene of the crime to the testimony of an eye-witness.
Eye-witness testimony is replete with well-known epistemic risks, e.g.,
racial bias, conflicts of interest, the unreliable and creative nature of
human memory, and outright lying; whereas hard physical evidence is
publicly available, out there for everyone to see. The prosecutor can tell
the jury, “The objective evidence is right before your nose. All you have
to do is look.” Physical evidence is objective, then, in the sense that
relying on it averts, at least to some degree, epistemic risks like personal
bias, conflicts of interest, fallible human memory, and dishonest testi-
mony. The very publicity of physical evidence makes it objective, al-
though this by no means implies that such evidence can't lead us astray.
It's simply to say that there are reasonable grounds to prefer it to less
reliable alternatives.
Again, as we saw in the scientific context, evidence in the law is also
called objective in virtue of the process by which it is acquired. For
example, law consultations on matters of public policy invariably in-
volve the review of relevant scientific evidence. Consider, for instance,
the final report from the Wessely Review – an independent review of
the Mental Health Act (1983) commissioned by the UK Department of
Health – which states that, on top of a robust consultation process, “we
spent time assessing existing evidence and data in relation to the Mental
Health Act, and commissioned bespoke data analysis to inform our
findings” (Department of Health and Social Care, 2018, p. 41). More-
over, the report assures us that not only was the existing evidence
considered, but a premium was placed on evidence reached via the
most rigorous available scientific methods. And this is all meant to
assure the public that the evidence they relied on was objective—that it
was reached via methods that manage important epistemic risks.
Finally, to drive home the difference between the two types of ob-
jective evidence we've discussed, consider an example that highlights
the distinction. Say that the court has a choice between E1 and E2. E1 is
physical evidence acquired in accordance with the proper evidence-
handling procedures we discussed in §4.2; and E2 is physical evidence
identical to E1 except that it was acquired in violation of the standard
procedures of evidence management. Despite being physically iden-
tical, the court would prefer E1 to E2, because although both avert
certain epistemic risks in virtue of their publicity, E1 averts additional
important epistemic risks in virtue of the manner it was acquired. In
other words, although physically identical, the court would consider E1
more objective than E2. Thus, in science and law, we refer to evidence
as objective due to i) its public nature and/or ii) the epistemic-risk-
mitigating processes whereby we obtain it.
5. Another word from our skeptics
At this point we should return to the deflationary skeptical attacks
on objectivity we mentioned at the outset, to see whether we've done
enough to answer them. We consider our answer to MacKinnon in §4.5
sufficient. We acknowledge the validity of her claim that objectivity can
function as a tool of oppression, but we don't think it necessarily must.
Moreover, we see authors like MacKinnon as allies in the process of
managing epistemic and phronetic risks. Such critics highlight collec-
tive and structural biases at work in the law that we must manage if we
hope to have an objective and just legal system. Far from deflating
objectivity, then, such critics do important work to make it possible.
What about Hacking's deflationary worries? Does the term ‘objec-
tivity’ really do any work on our approach? In other words, does talk
about objectivity do anything over and above simply pointing to the
totality of risks discussed in section four? Why talk about objective
evidence, for example, rather than simply saying that in selecting and
gathering our evidence we've managed the known epistemic risks? Why
talk about deliberative objectivity rather than saying that normatively
correct deliberative procedures were followed? Why not just stop
talking about objectivity and focus instead on doing ground-level ana-
lysis of the specific epistemic virtues and vices in individual instances of
scientific research, as Hacking suggests? What is the umbrella term
“objectivity” actually good for beyond generating confusion and dis-
agreement? Are we stuck with the term simply because scientific and
legal discourse is shot through with talk about objectivity? Is that suf-
ficient reason to preserve an idle wheel in our epistemic and phronetic
practices?
We reject Hacking's scepticism on two grounds. First, on Hacking's
own terms it matters normatively that objectivity is doing work in our
knowledge acquisition practices. Hacking, following J.L. Austin (1961),
enjoins us to examine terms in their “sites of use” (pp. 14–15), and he
appeals to the case of the ‘Commission of Inquiry into the Decline of
Sockeye Salmon in the Fraser River’ as evidence that the concept of
objectivity is not used in practice. However, we argue that objectivity
allows us to maintain the division of epistemic labour. That is, when we
look to its sites of use we see that it is not merely some esoteric phi-
losophical concept, but rather that it forms part of a socially useful
practice. And on Hacking's Austin-inspired account, that a term is used
in practice provides us with good reason to use it in philosophy.
Secondly, we can also find some guidance for the usefulness of the
abstract concept of objectivity in an analogous debate in political phi-
losophy over the usefulness of the concept of ‘justice’ – this is typically
referred to as the debate between ‘ideal’ and ‘non-ideal’ theory.
Amartya Sen (2006), for instance, argues that we do not need an ideal
theory of justice in order to pursue actual justice in the real world, and
that the ideal theory can even be a hindrance to this practical work. By
contrast, John Rawls (1999), argues that we need the ideal theory so
that we have something to aim at (pp 89–90). While it is beyond the
scope of this paper to engage fully in debate over ideal versus non-ideal
theories of justice (see Laura Valentini (2012) for a more complete
articulation of this debate), this at least shows us the appeal of abstract
philosophical concepts, such as justice and objectivity. Consider, for
instance, only being able to point to individual instances of social
wrongs in the world typically associated with injustice; we could, for
example, identify cases of police brutality and say that something so-
cially bad has happened there, but it would still be useful to appeal to
the abstract concept of injustice to explain that badness. Similarly,
while we could point to particular instances of scientific research vice
(as Hacking recommends), such as bias, it would still be useful to be
able to refer to the ideal of objectivity to explain what is going wrong
when these vices occur.16 Our commitment to justice as a normative
16 Jack Wright (2018) makes a similar point, arguing that objectivity is a
‘relational term’, by which he means that “objectivity helps to relate practices to
other practices and to the abstract uses, goals, ideals, and types of practices
associated with types of objectivity” (p. 389). Thinking of Wright's suggestion
as analogous to the debate between ideal versus non-ideal theory (as described
above) is useful, just because of how much material that debate has produced,
thus giving an idea of what the relational concept might look like.
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ideal keeps us vigilant in the fight against known manifestations of
injustice; but it also keeps us on the lookout for a) hitherto unknown
tokens of known types of injustice and b) unknown types of injustice;
and when we find these unknown tokens and types it affords us an
abstract concept to appeal to as we make sense of and learn how to
manage them. Our commitment to objectivity serves a similar role our
attempts to get things right, promoting vigilance in our efforts to
manage known epistemic and phronetic risks, keeping us on the lookout
for new tokens and types of such risks, and helping us make sense of
and manage these new tokens and types as they arise. As an organising
ideal for our practices, objectivity, like justice, does important work.
6. Conclusion
Taking inspiration from Koskinen's (2018) recent work, this paper
has proposed a shared rescue strategy for objectivity in science and the
law. In science, we need assurance that we can rely on each other as
epistemic agents, which requires guarding against a variety of very
specific epistemic risks in very context-specific ways. Objectivity is the
assurance that such epistemic risks have been managed. This is Koski-
nen's argument. We argue that the same is true in the law. The law's
legitimacy rests on its claim to objectivity. In other words, to be legit-
imate, the law needs to manage a range of epistemic, ethical and
phronetic risks. We argue that legal objectivity is the assurance that
context-specific measures have been taken to manage such risks, and
we have provided an indicative list of what some of the objectivity-
assuring strategies in the law currently are or should be. This list is not
exhaustive, and it will doubtlessly change as new sources of epistemic
and phronetic risks in the law emerge.
We believe that this approach to objectivity in the law can move us
beyond the dialectical stalemate in the current conversation about ob-
jectivity. Critics argue that genuinely determinate and objective legal
judgments are utterly beyond our reach, and so we should abandon all
pretence of the law's objectivity. Defenders of objectivity insist that the
ideal is indispensable, but their insistence on conceptualizing objec-
tivity as determinacy fails to do justice to the legitimate concerns raised
by the critics of objectivity, and so tends to alienate them. The risk
account of objectivity, we believe, can satisfy disputants on both sides
of this divide. For it acknowledges the power of the best critiques of
objectivity; indeed, it sees these critiques as an essential part of the
objective stance, as they identify the very epistemic and phronetic risks
that objective legal practice must manage. But the risk account of ob-
jectivity also does justice to the fact that the law is saturated with the
language of objectivity and that the ideal does important work in
practice. We are hopeful, then, that this approach will help us make
progress in contemporary debates about objectivity in science, law, and
in the domains where such concerns intersect, e.g., the intersection of
law and psychiatry. If we listen to the voices of all concerned, and take
seriously the epistemic and phronetic risks they call to our attention, a
workable approach to objectivity might just be within our fallible,
imperfect human reach.
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